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'

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This controversy arises from the Motion made by
defendant to modify a 1974 Divorce Decree for the purpose
of increasing child support.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A hearing was held upon defendant's Motion, at which
time The Honorable Don

v.

Tibbs entered an Order modifying

the Decree by increasing child support from a total of $125
to a total of $250.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant requests this Court to vacate any
award of child support as to Marsha Kiesel and to modify
the amount of child support as to Mary Kiesel.
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. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 1974, a Decree of Divorce was entered
dissolving the marriage of the parties to this action.
At such time it was provided that plaintiff should pay
support to his child Marsha Kaye Kiesel in the amount of
$75 per month and support of Mary Ann Kiesel in the amount
of $50 per month.

(R. p. 30.)

In addition, other awards

of property were made by the Court, including an award to
defendant of the family residence.
Subsequent to the divorce several Orders to Show Cause
were filed by both parties.

These Orders concerned various

subjects, including the failure of defendant to enroll Marsha
Kiesel in special training at Primary Children's Hospital.
Defendant was held in contempt of Court for this inaction
(R., p. 70-71).

Subsequently, defendant was also held in

contempt of Court for failing to bring the children before
the Court for interview and for continuing to harass plaintiff (R., p. 88).
On August 15, 1979, a Petition for Modification was
filed by defendant seeking an increase in support for Marsha
and Mary.

A hearing was held on September 26, 1979, regard-

ing this request.
The lower court found a chance of circumstances justify·
ing an increase of child support for Mary from $50 per month
-2-
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to $100 per month.

The Court continued support for Marsha,

even though at the time of the hearing she was over 20 years
of age.

The Court specifically found her to be a special

child with physical and mental deficiencies requiring continued support (R., p. 113-114).
It is from this Order of Modification that the present
appeal is taken (R., p. 117)0
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT DID NOT
JUSTIFY THE COURT'S MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE.
It is fundamental that a previously entered decree
may not be modified for the purpose of increasing support
unless it is alleged and proved and the trial court finds
that circumstances on which the decree was based have
substantially changed.
1953).

Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 986

(Utah

Each case must be determined upon the basis of the

immediate fact situation.

Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P.2d 784

{Utah 1977).,
This Court is authorized to make its own findings
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
when it would be fair and equitable and in the interest of
justice.

Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978)

Q

The lower court decision, however, will not be disturbed
unless it appears that the evidence so preponderates against
the trial court's finding that inequity or injustice results.
Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-3-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is also basic law that the trial court has considerable discretion in reviewing petitions for modification.

However, this discretion cannot be used to arrive

at decisions which are not based upon competent evidence
in the record ..
The decision of the Court at the conclusion of the
hearing was as follows:
The Court finds that in 1977 Mr. Kiesel
re~arried and that he"and his spouse
together, as shown by Exhibit No. 3,
had an adjusted gross income of $29,898.
The Court finds there was a loss in 1978
but the Court finds that a substantial
part of that was depreciation. The
Court finds that based upon the taxes
of 1979, there would be in excess of
$30,000 depreciation which would offset
the loss that Mr. Kiesel testified to.
The Court finds that there has been an
increase in Mr. Kiesel's gross earnings
to date of $10,042.95 and the Court finds
that Mrs. Kiesel has nominal earnings,
and the Court finds that this is a special
child and the record is replete all the
way through, right from the commencement
of this divorce action, concerning the
fact that this child would require special
education and special care for the balance
of her life and the Court is of the opinion
that Mrs. Kiesel is needed in the home to
take care of her and maintain her and do
the best she can with her.
The Court finds that there has been a
change of circumstances. As to Mary, the
support money is increased to $100 a month
and to the minor child, Marsha, that the
support should continue and the support
rate is set for $150 per month.
(R., p.
186-187.)
Several errors are apparent from the Court's stated
opinion.

First, the Court in arriving at the 1977 income
-4-
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and in the 1978 income utilized the income figures of
plaintiff's new wife.

Exhibit 3 entered by the defendant

shows that approximately $5,200 of the total $17,000 from
wages was earned by plaintiff's new wife.

Likewise,

Exhibits 1 and 4 show that in 1978 plaintiff's new wife
earned approximately $6,500 of the total $18,000 income
from wages.
The inclusion of plaintiff's new wife's income was
erroneous.

This Court has held on numerous occasions that

a husband may not def end against a claim for support from
his former wife based upon the husband's subsequent remarriage
and undertaking of expenses.

See Sorensen v. Sorensen,

438 P.2d 180 (Utah 1968); Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443
(Utah 1978}.

Likewise, if a wife remarries and her new

husband has substantial income and assets, this does not
relieve the former husband from his obligation of child
support.

Martin v. Martin, 251 SWe2d 302 (Ky. 1952)0

These standards are equally applicable to the instant
case.

If plaintiff cannot claim a defense because he has

married a woman and has assumed a responsibility as to her,
it is only just that defendant cannot claim an advantage
gained by plaintiff marrying a woman who also brings in income
to plaintiff's household.

Because of the irrelevant nature

of plaintiff's wife's income, no testimony was introduced
by plaintiff as to the obligations plaintiff's new wife has
-5-
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or the obligations which he has undertaken because of this
marriage.

It is no more relevant for plaintiff to claim

additional expenses from his new marriage to oppose defendant's Petition for Modification than it is for defendant
to include the income of plaintiff's new wife in support of
the Petition for Modificationo

The trial court erred in

including the new wife's income in computing a change of
circumstances.
Second, the Court erred in its determination that
no real loss was suffered by the plaintiff in 1978 and
1979.

Exhibits 1 and 4 show that plaintiff's wage income

for 1978 was approximately $12,700.

This income was

derived from his salary as Police Chief of Salina, Utah.
In addition, however, plaintiff is engaged in a trucking
business and has been since the time of the Divorce Decree.
In 1978 the Gordon Kiesel Trucking Company grossed $100,295.
(Schedule

c,

Exhibit 4.)

At the same time, however, the

total deductions amount to $151,666.

(Schedule

c,

Exhibit 4.)

The 1978 tax form showed a loss of $51,371.
Of this loss $32,000 was depreciation.

The trial

court discounted depreciation as a viable factor to represent
loss.

While depreciation may be an artificial element as to

real property, it is certainly a genuine loss as to personal
property involving mechanical vehicles such as dump trucks and
tractors.

The Court should take judicial notice that these

type of vehicles actually do lose their value each year and
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will eventually become useless as opposed to real property,
which gains in value each year and which does not suffer
any loss of use.
In any event, even if the depreciation is completely
discounted from the loss figures, the 1978 tax return still
shows an actual out-of-pocket loss of $20,000 from the
trucking business.
Mr. Kiesel explained that this loss was caused because
of an airplane accident which resulted in an injured back.
Because of this injury, plaintiff is now unable to make any
long-haul drives.

He has had to use his income to subsidize

his trucking business and has had to borrow money in order
to save it.

(R., 176-177.)

Plaintiff testified that for

1979 the income of the trucking business to September of that
year was $77,000, while his expenses were about $110,000.
(R., 175.)

This again resulted in a deficit of $30,000 in

actual out-of-pocket expenses.
The trial court noted there was a loss in 1978 but
found "a substantial part of that was depreciation."
for 1979, the court said:

As

"The Court finds that based

upon the taxes of 1979, there would be in excess of $30,000
depreciation which would offset the loss that Mr. Kiesel
testified to."

(R. 186.)

These oral statements were reduced

to written findings subsequently by the Court.

(R. 113-114.)

It is fundamental accounting that depreciation serves
no purpose in reducing a loss.

Depreciation is only good
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for offsetting income.

The Court erroneously concluded that

since plaintiff's depreciation for 1979 would amount to the
approximate sum of his out-of-pocket losses, that the two
would somehow offset each other.

Infact, however, deprecia-

tion only adds to the already existing loss, making a total
loss for plaintiff in 1979 of some $60,000.
Thus, the trucking business of plaintiff clearly
suffered an out-of-pocket loss of some $20,000 in 1978 and
some $30,000 in 1979.

In addition, the equipment owned by

plaintiff in actual value depreciated nearly $60,000.

The

combined out-of-pocket losses for plaintiff during the two
years was over $50,000, and the depreciation was over $60,000.
These figures definitely contradict the trial court's conclusion that no actual loss was incurred by plaintiff in
1978 and 1979.
In addition, the defendant failed to show any substantial
change in income from the trucking business of plaintiff in
the 1978-1979 years as compared with 1975.

The Answers to

Interrogatories submitted by plaintiff show, in fact, that
in July of 1975 plaintiff had an income of $5,807 from his
trucking business, while in January of 1978 he had only
$1,362.

(R.

100.)

The preceding

clearly shows that the trial court

erred in including the income of plaintiff's new wife in the
-8-
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computation of changed circumstances and also in concluding
that no actual monetary loss had been suffered by plaintiff
in his trucking business..

The only other income which could

be relied upon by the trial court was that of his salaried
job as Police Chief of Salina, Utah.

Again, plaintiff •s

Answers to Interrogatories show that in July of 1975 he was
grossing $850 per month, in 1978 he was grossing $1,029 per
month and in 1979 he was grossing $1,057 per month (R.,

P~

100, 173).
These figures show that plaintiff's actual salary
as a policeman increased $200 during the four year period,
or only 24 percent.
When this figure is compared with plaintiff's actual
losses from the trucking business, it can be seen that this
small increase was quickly absorbed by the losses sustained
in the trucking business.

But even if it were assumed that

plaintiff increased his income, this alone would not justify
an increase in support.

This Court has stated:

While an increase of the defendant's income
is certainly an importa~t factor to consider,
this proposition is also true: The fact
that a man may so use his abilities as to
increase his income should not necessarily
impose a penalty upon him by automatically
increasing his obligations under a divorce
decree.
The increase in income is only to
be considered along with the other facts
and circumstances concerning the needs of the
children and the ability of the father and
mother to provide for them.
Owen v. Owen,
579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978).
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Of course, the buying power of plaintiff's dollar is
no better and, in fact, is probably worse than it was in
197~.

This Court has held that while inflation is not a defense

to a modification request, that it is fair for the request to
be made proportional to the increased income of the father.
Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978).

In this case,

an increase of 25 percent would be equitable as compared
to an actual increase of 100 percent which was made by the
trial court as to each child.
The trial court also determined that the living
expenses of Marsha and Mary have "substantially increased
since the Decree of Divorce" (R. 114).

Plaintiff has no

dispute with this finding, but observes that his living
expenses have also increased substantially.

These expenses

were never offered by plaintiff, al though he could have done
so.
The Order of the trial court as to Mary Kiesel was
excessive.

There was no evidence presented by defendant

as to the monthly amount required to sustain Mary as compared
with the amount required back in 1974.

Rather, defendant

testified as to specific items of clothing which were purchased
for Mary and compared these i terns with what they would have cost
back in 1974.

(R. 150-153.)

Items such as shoes, a school

jacket, and sewing material could be items which would last
for many years and could not be computed on a monthly basis.
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition, the evidence showed that Mary was
making approximately $100 a month as a waitress not including tips, which could have increased this amount substantially,
as evidenced by the fact that Mary had made $9e00 in tips on
the night prior to the trials
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based upon his
negative income, the failure of defendant to show the monthly
living expenses of Mary, and her present ability to work, that
an increase to $70 per month would be equitable.
The Court also abused is discretion with reference to
Marsha

Kiesel.

As will be noted infra, it is plaintiff's

contention that the trial court had no authority to order
support for Marsha since she was 20 at the time of the hearing
and was no longer a minor.

Irrespective of this argument,

however, the evidence does not warrant an increase in the
support paid by plaintiff to defendant for Marsha's benefit.
There can be no doubt that Marsha has a mental and
physical handicap which results in her being unable to financially
support herself.
This situation is indeed unfortunate.

However, even

if it is assumed that plaintiff must continue to support her
for the rest of her life, a 100 percent increase in the amount
is not justified.

Defendant testified that she is presently

receiving $208 from Social Security as a supplement for retarded
children.

This money is presumably based upon the present

-11-
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$75 amount being paid to defendant by plaintiff for Marsha's
support.

Defendant testified that an increase in support

by plaintiff would amount to a decrease in the amount of
payment by the Social Security Administration.

(R. 155.)

While the record is unclear as to the relationship between
support and Social Security payments, this Court can take
judicial notice that the Social Security regulations require
a dollar-for-dollar reduction for any amount received as
child support.

In other words, the award of $75 additional

support would decrease the Social Security benefits by $75.
It is obvious that the effect of increasing the award
to Marsha has no net gain for the benefit of the child.
Since plaintiff has contributed throughout his life to the
Social Security fund, and since the fund is especially
establish to assist retarded.children, it serves no purpose
to require plaintiff to pay the additional $75 while at the
same time relieving the Federal Government of this obligation.
This is especially true considering plaintiff's serious
financial situation based upon the enormous losses he has
suffered during the last two years in hi·s trucking operation
as a result of his accident.
It should also be borne in mind that defendant is
receiving $253 from Welfare (R. 153), earns small income
from the· sale of Avon products, and uses approximately $50
a month worth of products for herself and her children.
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 160.)

While it undoubtedly difficult for defendant to

carry on a full time job because of Marsha's condition, the
Court's conclusion that defendant is needed in the home to
take care of Marsha is not justified for part-time work, which
defendant has never attempted to obtain.

In addition, the

original Divorce Decree specifically found that "defendant
has earned and is capable of earning sufficient funds for
her personal support, 0 even though at the time Marsha was a
special child and required the same type of care.

(R. 26.)

The fact that the needs of the children have increased
since 1975 does not in itself justify an increase in support·
without consideration of other factors, including the supplemental income which has been derived by defendant in their
support, together with the ability of Mary to support herself.
These are always difficult cases but this Court stated the
following consideration in determining whether modification
is justified:
There is no question but what plaintiff cannot
fully support the children on $100 a month and
that she needs the $140.
That, however, is
only one of a number of important factors to
be considered in making an award for their
support.
When one blanket is cut to fit two
beds it seldom will cover them both.
The best
that the Court can do usually is to make such
division of the income as seems most reasonable,
fair and equitable to all concerned under the
circumstances. This is often done indulging
the hope that the slack may be made up some
other way.
Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 286, 287
(Utah 1953).

-13-
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The "slack" in this case has been made up by the
Social Security Administration, the State Welfare, the
income of Mary, and the actual and potential income of
defendant.

To now require plaintiff to pay an additional

$125 a month in view of the obvious financial crisis he
has encountered is inequitable and unjust, especially
considering that $75 of that amount is only substituting
the payment already made by the Social Security Administration.
Because the trial court improperly considered the
income of plaintiff's wife, improperly concluded that the
plaintiff had not suffered actual monetary losses during
the last two years, and had improperly failed to take in
account the equities existing between the parties as to
their abilities and needs, the Order of the trial court
increasing support should be modified to $70 for the support
of Mary and $75 for the support of Marsha, assuming that
any support of Marsha is justified.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER UTAH STATUTORY
DIVORCE LAW TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR MARSHA PAST
THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE.
The trial court found that Marsha was a special child
due to her inability to care for herself, and that she had
physical and mental deficiencies which rendered her wholly
dependent upon the defendant for her daily needs and care,
and that she was in need of special schooling and medical
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treatment.

(R. 114.)

Plaintiff does not dispute this finding.

The only

question is whether plaintiff is legally obligated under the
Decree of Divorce to continue support of Marsha

for the

rest of her life.
Plaintiff asserts that regardless of what moral or
ethical obligation he believes he has as to the care and
maintenance of Marsha, he is not under a legal obligation
to continue support of her by the terms of the Divorce
Decree.
This same question has been raised before this Court
in Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).

In a three to

two decision this Court held that §30-3-5, U.C.Aet does not
limit the term "children" to minor children as defined in
§15-2-1, U.C.A.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that in

light of decisions subsequent to Dehm and in light of the
reasoning stated in the dissent, that this decision should
be overruled.
There are basically three statutory sections which
are applicable to the resolution of this question.

The

first is §30-3-5, u.c.A., which states that a court may make
such orders in relation to the "childrenu as may be equitable,
and that the court may make subsequent changes for the
support of the "children."

As noted in the Dehm opinion, no

definition of "children" is provided in the divorce code.
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The second applicable section in 15-2-1, U.C.A.,
(Supp. 1953), which states the following:
The period of minority extends in males and
females to the age of 18 years; but all
minors obtain their majority by marriage.
It is further provided that Courts in
divorce actions may order support to age
21.
The third applicable law is known as the ''Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act" contained in Chapter 45
of Title 78.

This Act provides that every man shall support

his child and wife and that every woman shall support her
child and husband.

The amended version of §78-45-2 defines

"child" as a son or daughter under the age of 18 years and
a son or daughter of whatever age who is

incapacitated

from earning a living and without sufficient means.
Plaintiff submits that §30-3-5 must be read solely
in conjunction with §15-2-1 in that the Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act has no application to divorce
actions.

The reasoning behind this argument is as follows.
First, since the divorce statute, §30-3-5, provides

no definition of "children" it is necessary for the courts
to determine when the obligation for child support ceases.
Historically, this Court has equated "children" with the
definition of "minor" children provided for in §15-2-1.
The original statute passed in 1898 and recodified in the
1953 Code, stated that a male was a minor until 21 years of

-16-
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age and a female until 18 years of age.

In the context of

a divorce action, the United States Supreme Court held that
§15-2-1 was unconstitutional in that two separate ages were
established for males and females with no justifiable reason
for such classification.
(1975).

Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7

This Court in three separate decisions finally con-

cluded that in the context of a divorce decree the period of
minority extended to 18 for both sexes.

See 517 P.2d 1010

(Utah 1974); 552 P.2d 112 (Utah 1976); and 564 P.2d 303 (Utah
1977). In each case decided by this Court and the United States
Supreme Court, all references as to the meaning of the divorce
decree were to §15-2-1.

No reference was ever made in any of

these decisions to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act.
It is obvious that §15-2-1 is the controlling definition
of §30-3-5 since the original definition contained in §78-45-2
would not have been offensive to the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution, and would not have resulted
in review by the United States Supreme Court.

§78-45-2 as

passed in 1957 defined "child" as a son or daughter under the
age of 21 years, as well as a son or daughter who is incompacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.
Obviously, this Section adopted a uniform age for both sexes
and had it been applicable to a divorce context, the Stanton
cases would not have resulted.
-17-
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The dissent in Dehm written by Justice Tuckett notes
this relationship between the divorce code and the definition
of minors contained in §15-2-1.

The dissent specifically

notes that the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act provides
a separate cause of action for the enforcement of the duty of
support by parents, but that there is no provision made which
would permit enforcement under the divorce laws.

The dissent

concludes by stating:
It is further noted that the Uniform Support
Act designates who may become parties and
those designated are not necessarily a
husband and wife.
I do not think the Court
should commingle the provisions of that
Act with Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, which
deals with the support of minor children in
a divorce proceeding.
545 P.2d 529-530.
Regardless of any liability plaintiff may have under
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the trial court
did not have authority to order perpetual support for Marsha
under the terms of the Divorce Decree pursuant to the statutory
authority granted by §30-3-5.

Rather, §15-2-1 only allows the

Court to order support to age 21 upon a special finding of
unusual circumstances to justify such extension.
Harris, 585 P.2d 435

(Utah 1978).

Harris v.

Had the Legislature wished

to extend support in divorces for children who are

incaoaci tated,
~

I

it could have done so by either defining children as such with~:
Title 30 of the Divorce Code, or by amending §15-2-1 to include
such children.

As a result, this Court can only enforce

support for Marsha under statutory authority which would
clearly terminate at age 21 regardless of Mar~ha's physical
-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or mental capacity.
Plaintiff, therefore, submits that the Stanton decisions
clearly establish the relationship of the Divorce Code with the
minority definition and that the dissent in the Dehm case was
correct in its analysis, and therefore that the Dehm case should
be overruled and that the Order requiring support of Marsha
past 21 years of age must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Although the trial court has considerable discretion
in its decisions concerning modification, this discretion is
not unlimited.

The Court does not have discretion to include

irrelevant evidence as to the income of plaintiff's wife in
computing his income.

The Court does not have discretion to

erroneously conclude that depreciation will offset a loss when
in fact it can only offset a gain.

The Court does not have

discretion to ignore the economic realities of the situation
where plaintiff's increased payments as to Marsha will only
substitute for the money which defendant is presently receiving from Social Security of which plaintiff has contributed
from his lifetime wages.
While the trial court followed the existing law as
to support for retarded children, the Dehm case must be overruled in light of the clear relationship estaplished between
§30-3-5 and §15-2-1, U.C.A., as established by the subsequent
-19-
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Stanton decisions.
For these reasons, therefore, the award of support
for Mary should be modified and the award of support to
Marsha should be vacatede
Respectfully submitted,

KAY M.

LEWIS

1&~2>-~
CIG~COOK

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellanl
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